False-Name-Proof Facility Location on Discrete Structures by Todo, Taiki et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
7.
08
91
4v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  2
1 J
ul 
20
19
False-Name-Proof Facility Location
on Discrete Structures ∗
Taiki Todo, Nodoka Okada, and Makoto Yokoo
July 23, 2019
Abstract
We consider the problem of locating a single facility on a vertex in a given
graph based on agents’ preferences, where the domain of the preferences is either
single-peaked or single-dipped. Our main interest is the existence of deterministic
social choice functions (SCFs) that are Pareto efficient and false-name-proof, i.e.,
resistant to fake votes. We show that regardless of whether preferences are single-
peaked or single-dipped, such an SCF exists (i) for any tree graph, and (ii) for a
cycle graph if and only if its length is less than six. We also show that when the
preferences are single-peaked, such an SCF exists for any ladder (i.e., 2×m grid)
graph, and does not exist for any larger hypergrid.
1 Introduction
Social choice theory analyzes how collective decisions are made based on the pref-
erences of individual agents. Its typical application field is voting, where each agent
reports a preference ordering over a set of alternatives and a social choice function
(SCF) selects one. One of the most well-studied criteria for SCFs is robustness to
agents’ manipulations. An SCF is truthful if no agent can benefit by telling a lie, and
false-name-proof if it is no agent cann benefit by casting multiple votes. The Gibbard-
Satterthwaite theorem implies that any deterministic, truthful, and Pareto efficient (PE)
SCF must be dictatorial. Also, any false-name-proof (FNP) SCF must be random-
ized [7].
Overcoming such negative results has been a promising research direction. One
of the most popular approaches is to restrict agents’ preferences. For example, when
their preferences are restricted to being single-peaked, the well-known median voter
schemes are truthful, PE, and anonymous [17], and their strict subclass is also FNP [27].
The model where agents’ preferences are single-peaked has also been called the facility
location problem, where each agent has an ideal point on an interval, e.g., on a street,
and the SCF locates a public good, e.g., a train station, to which agents want to stay
close.
∗We thank Yuho Wada for his helpful comments and discussions on the previous version of this draft. All
errors are our own.
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Table 1: Summary of our contributions. ✓ indicates an FNP and PE SCF, and ✗ indi-
cates that no such SCF exists. It remains open to clarify whether such an SCF exists
for general hypergrid graphs when agents’ preferences are single-dipped.
Tree Cycle Ck Hypergrid
Single-Peaked Any ✓ [18] k ≤ 5 ✓ (Thm. 3) Ladder ✓ [18]
k ≥ 6 ✗ (Thm. 4) Other ✗ (Thm. 5 and 6)
Single-Dipped Any ✓ (Thm. 7) k ≤ 5 ✓ (Thm. 8) Open
k ≥ 6 ✗ (Thm. 9)
Moulin [17], as well as many other works on facility location problems, considered
an interval as the set of possible alternatives, where any point in the interval can be
chosen by an SCF. In several practical situations, however, the set of possible alterna-
tives is discrete and has slightly more complex underlying network structure, which the
agents’ preferences also respect. For example, in multi-criteria voting with two criteria,
each of which has only three options, the underlying network is a three-by-three grid.
When we need to choose a time-slot to organize a joint meeting, the problem resembles
choosing a point on a discrete cycle. Dokow et al. [8] studied truthful SCFs on discrete
lines and cycles. Ono et al. [20] considered FNP SCFs on a discrete line. However,
there has been very few works on FNP SCFs on more complex structures (see Related
Works section).
In this paper we tackle the following question: for which graph structures does
an FNP and PE SCF exist? When the mechanism designer can arbitrarily modify the
network structure of the set of possible alternatives, the problem is simplified. The
network structure, however, is a metaphor of a common feature among agents’ prefer-
ences, where modifying the network structure equals changing the domain of agents’
preferences. This is almost impossible in practice because agents’ preferences are their
own private information. The mechanism designer, therefore, first faces the problem
of verifying whether, under a given network structure (or equally, a given preference
domain), a desirable SCF exists.
Locating a bad is another possible extension of the facility location problem, where
an SCF is required to locate a public bad, e.g., a nuclear plant or a disposal station,
which each agent wants to avoid. Agents’ preferenes are therefore assumed to be
single-dipped, which is sometimes called obnoxious. Actually, some existing works
have studied truthful facility location with single-dipped preferences [5]. Nevertheless,
to the best of our knowledge, no work has dealt with both false-name-proofness and
more complex structures than a path, such as cycles.
Table 1 summarizes our contribution. Regardless of whether the preferences are
single-peaked or single-dipped, there is an FNP and PE SCF for any tree graph and any
cycle graph of length less than six, and there is no such SCF for any larger cycle graph.
For hypergrid graphs, when preferences are single-peaked, such an SCF exists if and
only if the given hypergrid graph is a ladder, i.e., of dimension two and at least one of
which has at most two vertices.
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2 Related Works
Moulin [17] proposed generalized median voter schemes, which are the only determin-
istic, truthful, PE, and anonymous SCFs. Procaccia and Tennenholtz [21] proposed a
general framework of approximate mechanism design, which evaluates the worst case
performance of truthful SCFs from the perspective of competitive ratio. Recently, some
models for locating multiple heterogenous facilities have also been studied [23, 11, 3].
Wada et al. [29] considered the agents who dynamically arrive and depart. Some re-
search also considered facility location on grids [25, 9] and cycles [1, 2, 8]. Melo et
al. [16] overviewed applications in practical decision making.
Over the last decade, false-name-proofness has been scrutinized in various mecha-
nism design problems [30, 4, 26, 28], as a refinement of truthfulness for such open and
anonymous environments, as the internet. Bu [6] clarified a connection between false-
name-proofness and population monotonicity in general social choice. Lesca et al. [14]
also addressed FNP SCFs that are associated with monetary compensation. Sonoda et
al. [24] considered the case of locating two homogeneous facilities. Ono et al. [20]
studied some discrete structures, but focused on randomized SCFs.
One of the most similar works to this paper is Nehama et al. [18], who also clarified
the network structures under which FNP and PE SCFs exist for single-peaked prefer-
ences. One clear difference from ours is that, in their paper proposed a new class of
graphs, called a ZV-line, as a generalization of path graphs. In our paper we investi-
gate well-known existing structures, namely tree, hypergrid, and cycle graphs. ZV-line
graphs contain any tree and ladder (i.e., 2 ×m-grid for arbitrary m ≥ 2), but do not
cover any other graphs considered in this paper, such as larger (hyper-)grid graphs and
cycle graphs with lengths over three.
Locating a public bad has also been widely studied in both economics and com-
puter science fields. Manjunath [15] characterized truthful SCFs on an interval. Lahiri
et al. [13] studied the model for locating two public bads. Feigenbaum and Sethu-
raman [10] considered the cases where single-peaked and single-dipped preferences
coexist. Nevertheless, all of these works just focused on truthful SCFs. To the best of
our knowledge, this paper is the very first work on FNP facility location with single-
dipped preferences.
3 Preliminaries
Let Γ := (V,E) be an undirected, connected graph, defined by the set V of vertices
and the set E of edges. The distance function d : V 2 → N≥0 is such that for any
v, w ∈ V , d(v, w) := #{e ∈ E|e ∈ s(v, w)}, where s(v, w) is the shortest path
between v and w. We say that a graph Γ′ := (V ′, E′) has another graph Γ := (V,E)
as a distance-preserving induced subgraph if Γ′ has Γ as an induced subgraph and for
any pair v, w ∈ V and their corresponding vertices v′, w′ ∈ V ′, d(v′, w′) = d(v, w)
holds.
In this paper we focus on three classes of graphs, namely tree, cycle, and hypergrid.
A tree graph is an undirected, connected and acyclic graph. A special case of tree
graphs is called as a path graph, in which only two vertices have a degree of one and
3
all the others have a degree of two. Indeed, tree graphs are a simplest generalization
of path graphs, so that most of the properties of path graphs, such as the uniqueness of
the shortest path between two vertices, carries over to tree graphs. A cycle graph is an
undirected and connected graph that only consists of a single cycle. When a cycle graph
has k vertices, we refer to it as Ck, and its vertices are labeled, in a counter-clockwise
order, from v1 to vk.
A hypergrid graph is a Cartesian product of more than one path graphs. When a
hypergridΓ is a Cartesian product of k path graphs, we call it a k-dimensional (k-D, in
short) grid. In this paper, a 2-D grid is sometimes represented by the number of vertices
on each path, as l ×m-grid. In a given k-D grid graph, each vertex v is represented as
a k-tuple (vk′)1≤k′≤k. Note that the 2-D 2× 2-grid is a cycle graph C4.
LetN be the set of potential agents, and letN ⊆ N be a set of participating agents.
Each agent i ∈ N has a type θi ∈ V . When agent i has type θi, agent i is located on
vertex θi. Let θ := (θi)i∈N ∈ V |N | denote a profile of the agents’ types, and let
θ−i := (θi′)i′ 6=i denote their profile without i’s. Given θ, let I(θ) ⊆ V be the set of
vertices on which at least one agent is located, i.e., I(θ) :=
⋃
i∈N θi. Furthermore,
given θ and vertex v ∈ I(θ), let θ−v be the profile obtained by removing all the agents
at the vertex v from θ. By definition, I(θ−v) = I(θ) \ {v}.
Given Γ and v ∈ V , let %v be the preference of the agent located on vertex v over
the set V of alternatives, where ≻v and ∼v indicate the strict and indifferent parts of
%v, respectively. A preference%v is single-peaked (resp. single-dipped) under Γ if, for
any w, x ∈ V , w ≻v x if and only if d(v, w) < d(v, x) (resp. d(v, w) > d(v, x)), and
w ∼v x if and only if d(v, w) = d(v, x). That is, an agent located on v strictly prefers
alternative w, which is strictly closer to (resp. farther from) v than other alternative
x, and is indifferent between these alternatives when they are the same distance from
v. By definition, for each possible type θi, the single-peaked (resp. single-dipped)
preference is unique.
A (deterministic) SCF is a mapping from the set of possible profiles to the set of
vertices. Since each agent may pretend to be multiple agents in our model, an SCF
must be defined for different-sized profiles. To describe this feature, we define an SCF
f = (fN )N⊆N as a family of functions, where each fN is a mapping from V
|N | to
V . When a set N of agents participates, the SCF f uses function fN to determine the
outcome. The function fN takes profile θ of types jointly reported by N as an input,
and returns fN(θ) as an outcome. We denote fN as f if it is clear from the context. We
further assume that an SCF f is anonymous, i.e., for any input θ and its permutation θ′,
f(θ′) = f(θ) holds.
We are now ready to define the two desirable properties of SCFs: false-name-
proofness and Pareto efficiency.
Definition 1. An SCF f is false-name-proof (FNP) if for any N , θ, i ∈ N , θi ∈ V ,
θ′i ∈ V , Φi ⊆ N \N , and θΦi ∈ V
|Φi|, it holds that f(θ) %θi f(θ
′
i, θΦi , θ−i).
The set Φi indicates the set of identities added by i for the manipulation. The
property coincides with the canonical truthfulness when Φi = ∅, i.e., agent i only uses
one identity.
Definition 2. An alternative v ∈ V Pareto dominates w ∈ V under θ if v %θi w for
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all i ∈ N and v ≻θj w for some j ∈ N . An SCF f is Pareto efficient (PE) if for anyN
and θ, no alternative v ∈ V Pareto dominates f(θ).
Given θ, let PE(θ) ⊆ V indicate the set of all alternatives that are not Pareto domi-
nated by any alternative.
In general, the following theorem holds, which has recently been provided by the
authors’ another paper [19] and justifies to focus on a special class of FNP and PE
SCFs. An SCF f is said to ignore duplicate ballots (or satisfies IDB in short) if for any
pair θ, θ′, I(θ) = I(θ′) implies f(θ) = f(θ′).
Theorem 1 (Okada et al. [19]). Assume there is an FNP and PE SCF f that does not
satisfy IDB. Then, there is also an FNP and PE SCF f ′ that satisfies IDB.
Therefore, in what follows, we focus on FNP and PE SCFs that also satisfies IDB.
4 Single-Peaked Preferences
In this section, we focus on single-peaked preferences, i.e., every agent prefers to have
the facility closer to her. It is already known that for any tree graph, and thus for any
path graph, an FNP and PE SCF exists.
Theorem 2 (Nehama et al. [18]). Assume that agents’ preferences are single-peaked.
For any tree graph, there is an FNP and PE SCF.
An example of such an SCF is the target rule [12], originally proposed for an inter-
val, i.e., a continuous line such as [0, 1]. It is shown that the target rule is FNP and PE
for any tree metric [27]. Almost the same proof works for any tree graph.
In the following two subsections, we investigate the existence of such SCFs for
cycle and hypergrid graphs. The two lemmata presented below are useful to prove the
impossiblity results for single-peaked preferences.
Lemma 1. Let Γ be an arbitrary graph. Assume that agents’ preferences are single-
peaked under Γ and there is no truthful and PE SCF for Γ. Then, for any graph Γ′
that contains Γ as a distance-preserving induced subgraph, there is no truthful and PE
SCF.
Proof. Since there is no such SCF for Γ, we can find a sequence of profiles s.t. at least
one agent benefits by a manipulation. Since Γ′ has Γ as a distance-preserving induced
subgraph, and any PE alternative for profiles inside Γ is located in Γ due to single-
peakedness, exactly the same benefit is guaranteed for an agent by a manipulation in
Γ′.
Lemma 2. Let Γ be an arbitrary graph. Assume that agents’ preferences are single-
peaked under a graph Γ. Then, for any FNP SCF f , any θ and any v ∈ I(θ), [f(θ) ∈
I(θ) ∧ f(θ) ∈ I(θ−v)]⇒ [f(θ−v) = f(θ)].
Proof. Assume that f(θ−v) 6= f(θ). Since f(θ) ∈ I(θ), there is some agent located
at f(θ), who incurs the cost of zero when θ is reported and is still present when all the
agents at v are removed. Since f(θ) 6= f(θ−v), such an agent incurs the cost of more
than zero when all the agents at v are removed. Thus, the agent located at f(θ) has an
incentive to add identities at v, which contradicts false-name-proofness.
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Figure 1: SPRs for C3, C4, and C5. The arrows indicate the associated ordering σ.
4.1 Single-Peaked Preferences on Cycles
In this section, we show that, under single-peaked preferences, there is an FNP and PE
SCF for Ck if and only if k ≤ 5.
The if part is is informally mentioned in Nehama et al. [18], but the formal proof is
not given. To show the existence of such SCFs, we first define a class of SCFs, called
sequential Pareto rules (SPRs). Given cycle Ck, an SPR has an ordering σ of all the
alternatives in Ck. For a given input θ, it sequentially checks, in the order specified by
σ, whether the first (second, third, and so on) alternative is PE, and terminates when it
finds a PE one. By definition, any SPR is automatically PE.
For a continuous circle, any truthful and PE SCF is dictatorial [22]. Since choosing
such a dictator in a non-manipulable manner, when there is uncertainty on identities,
is quite difficult, FNP and PE SCFs are not likely to exist for a continuous circle. Our
results in this section thus demonstrate the power of the discretization of the alternative
space; by discretizing the set of alternatives so that at most five alternatives exist along
with a cycle, we can avoid falling into the impossibility.
Dokow et al. [8] showed that any truthful and onto SCF is nearly dictatorial for
a cycle Ck with k ≥ 22. In this paper we clarify a stricter threshold on such an
impossibility when agents can pretend to be multiple agents; FNP SCFs exist for a
cycle Ck if and only if k ≤ 5.
Theorem 3. Let Γ be a cycle graph Ck s.t. 3 ≤ k ≤ 5. When preferences are single-
peaked, there is an FNP and PE SCF.
Proof. It is obvious that any SPR is FNP for C3. For C4, the SPR with the ordering
v1 → v3 → v2 → v4 is FNP. Finally, for C5, the SPR with the ordering v1 → v2 →
v5 → v3 → v4 is FNP, which was also informally mentioned in [18]. These rules are
described in Fig. 1.
Theorem 4. Let Γ be a cycle graphCk s.t. k ≥ 6. When preferences are single-peaked,
there is no FNP and PE SCF.
The impossibility for C6 is important because we will use it in the proof of Theo-
rem 6 in the next subsection.
Proof. Assume that an FNP and PE SCF f exists for any Ck, say, C6 for even k and
C7 for odd k, and w.l.o.g. that f(θ) = v1 for any profile θ s.t. I(θ) = V .
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Figure 2: Profiles for Theorem 4. The intersection of two profiles corresponds to θ∗.
For C6: Consider a profile θ
′ s.t. I(θ′) = {v2, v3, v4, v5} (see the left cycle of
Fig. 2). Since f is FNP and PE, f(θ′) = v3 holds. Let θ
∗ be a profile s.t. I(θ∗) =
{v3, v4, v5}, i.e., the antipodal to the vertex v1 = f(θ) and its two neighbors. Lemma 2
implies f(θ∗) = v3. We then consider another profile θ
′′ s.t. I(θ′′) = {v3, v4, v5, v6}.
From symmetry and Lemma 2, f(θ∗) = v5, which contradicts f(θ
∗) = v3. Almost the
same argument holds for any larger even k.
For C7: Consider profile θ
(1) s.t. I(θ(1)) = {v3, v4, v5, v6} (see the right cycle of
Fig. 2). Since f is FNP and PE, f(θ(1)) must be either v4 or v5. Assume w.l.o.g. that
f(θ(1)) = v5. From Lemma 2, removing either v3 or v6 does not change the outcome,
i.e., for θ∗ s.t. I(θ∗) = {v3, v4, v5}, f(θ∗) = v5.
Then consider another profile θ(2) s.t. I(θ(2)) = {v2, v3, v4, v5}. Since f is FNP
and PE, f(θ(2)) 6∈ {v4, v5}; otherwise agents located on v2 would add fake identities
so that the outcome changes to v1. Similarly, f(θ
(2)) 6= v3; otherwise, it must be the
case that f(θ∗) = v3, which yields a contradiction. Thus, f(θ
(2)) = v2.
However, f(θ(2)) = v2 implies f(θ
∗) 6= v5; otherwise agents located on v3 would
add fake identities so that the outcome changes to v2. This also yields a contradiction.
Almost the same argument holds for any larger odd k.
One might think that an SPR associated with any possible ordering is FNP. How-
ever, the following example shows that the ordering must be carefully chosen to guar-
antee false-name-proofness (and truthfulness as well). Characterizing FNP and PE
SCFs for a given cycle graph remains open.
Example 1. Consider C5 and an SPR f associated with ordering v1 → v2 → v3 →
v4 → v5. Assume that there are three agents, whose types are θ = (v3, v4, v5). Since
PE(θ) = {v3, v4, v5}, v3 is chosen as an outcome when all the agents reports truthfully,
where the agent located at v5 incurs the cost of 3. However, she can benefit by reporting
v1 as her type, since PE(v1, v3, v4) = V , and thus f(v1, v3, v4) = v1 reduces her cost
to 1.
4.2 Single-Peaked Preferences on Hypergrids
The facility location on a hypergrid graph is a reasonable simplification of multi-criteria
voting [25], where each candidate has a pledge for each criteria, such as taxation and
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diplomacy, that is embeddable on a hypergrid. Each voter then has the most/least
preferred point on the hypergrid.
In this section, we completely clarify under which condition on a given hypergrid
graph an FNP and PE SCF exists when agents’ preferences are single-peaked.
It is already known that, when preferences are single-peaked, an FNP and PE SCF
exists for any 2 ×m-grid [18]. Our main contribution in this subsection, Theorem 5,
complements their result; no such SCF exists for any other 2-D grid. Theorem 6 further
shows that this impossibility carries over into any k-D grid with k ≥ 3.
Theorem 5. Let Γ be an l ×m-grid, where l,m ≥ 3. When preferences are single-
peaked, there is no FNP and PE SCF.
Proof. Lemma 4 below shows that, for the 3 × 3-grid, there is no FNP and PE SCF.
Since any l × m-grid Γ, for arbitrary l,m ≥ 3, contains the 3 × 3-grid graph as a
distance-preserving induced subgraph, the impossiblity carries over into Γ according
to Lemma 1.
Lemma 3. Let Γ be the 2×3-grid, where the set of vertices V = {v1,1, v1,2, v1,3, v2,1, v2,2, v2,3}.
Assume that agents’ preferences are single-peaked under Γ and there is an FNP and
PE SCF f . Then, for any θ s.t. I(θ) = V , f(θ) must be one of the four corners of Γ,
i.e., f(θ) ∈ {v1,1, v1,3, v2,1, v2,3}.
Proof. Asssume w.l.o.g. that f(θ) = v1,2. We construct a profile θ
′ s.t. I(θ′) =
{v1,1, v2,1, v2,2, v2,3}. Since f is FNP, f(θ′) = v2,1. We also construct another profile
θ′′ s.t. I(θ′′) = {v1,3, v2,1, v2,2, v2,3}. Since f is FNP, f(θ′′) = v2,3. Finally, let θ∗ be
the profile constructed by removing all the agents located on v1,1, v1,2, and v1,3. By
applying Lemma 2 to those profiles, we obtain both f(θ∗) = v2,1 and f(θ
∗) = v2,3,
which yield a contradiction.
Lemma 4. Let Γ be the 2-D 3 × 3-grid. When preferences are single-peaked, there is
no FNP and PE SCF.
Proof. Assume that an FNP and PE SCF f exists for the 3× 3-grid. From Lemmata 2
and 3, for any θ s.t. I(θ) = V , f(θ) ∈ {(1, 1), (1, 3), (3, 1), (3, 3)} holds. From
symmetry, assume w.l.o.g. that f(θ) = (1, 1) (see the top-left grid in Fig. 3).
We now remove all the agents located at (1, 1) from the above profile θ, and re-
fer to them as θ′. Since f is FNP and PE, f(θ′) = (2, 2). Here, let θ′′ be the
profile that further removes all the agents located at (1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 2), and (2, 3)
from θ′. Note that I(θ′′) = {(2, 1), (3, 1), (3, 2), (3, 3)}, and thus f(θ′′) = (3, 1)
holds by the same argument. We also consider another profile, θ′′′, which is obtained
by removing all the agents at (1, 2), (2, 1), and (2, 2) from θ′. Note that I(θ′′′) =
{(1, 3), (2, 3), (3, 1), (3, 2), (3, 3)}, and f(θ′′′) = (3, 3) by the same argument.
Then we construct θ∗ by removing all the agents in the vertices except for (3, 1),
(3, 2), and (3, 3) from θ′. Since θ∗ is reachable from both θ′′ and θ′′′, Lemma 2 implies
f(θ∗) = (3, 1) and f(θ∗) = (3, 3), which yields a contradiction.
Theorem 6. Let Γ be an arbitrary k(> 2)-D grid. When preferences are single-
peaked, there is no FNP and PE SCF.
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Figure 3: Type profiles for Lemma 4. On each gray vertex there is some agent, and the
vertex with f must be chosen under the profile. The proof derives a contradiction on
θ∗.
Proof. We can easily observe that a three-dimensional 2 × 2 × 2-grid, a.k.a. the bi-
nary cube, contains C6 as a distance-preserving induced subgraph. As we showed in
Theorem 4 in the previous section, there is no FNP and PE SCF for C6. Therefore,
by Lemma 1, no such SCF also exists for the 2 × 2 × 2-grid. Any other larger grid
(possibly of more than three dimensions) contains the three-dimensional 2×2×2-grid,
and thus the impossibility is carried over by Lemma 1.
5 Single-Dipped Preferences
5.1 Single-Dipped Preferences on Trees
For the case of a public bad, where agents’ preferences are single-dipped, we can find
an FNP and PE SCF.
Theorem 7. Let Γ be an arbitrary tree graph. When preferences are single-dipped,
there is an FNP and PE SCF.
Proof. Consider the SCF described as follows. First, choose an arbitrary longest path
pi∗ of a given tree, whose extremes are called a and b. Then, return a as an outcome if
at least one agent strictly prefers a to b; otherwise return b as an outcome.
For each agent i, either a or b is one of the most preferred alternative; otherwise,
the path from the most preferred point of i to one of the two extremes is longer than
pi∗. In Fig. 4, the agents at the bottom left gray vertex most prefer b, while agents at the
middle or top-right gray vertices most prefer a. It is therefore obvious that the above
SCF is PE, since either a or b is the most preferred alternative for each agent, and the
choice between a and b is made by a unanimous voting, guaranteeing that the chosen
9
Figure 4: The red edges construct the longest path pi∗. For the profile where some
agent exists on each of the gray vertices, the SCF in the proof of Theorem 2 returns a
as an outcome.
alternative is the most preferred for at least one agent. Furthermore, such a unanimous
voting over two alternatives is obviously FNP.
5.2 Single-Dipped Preferences on Cycles
We next consider locating a public bad on a cycle. Single-dipped preferences resem-
ble single-peaked preferences for cycle graphs, especially for sufficiently large ones.
Actually, in this subsection we provide almost the same results with the case of single-
peaked preferences.
Theorem 8. Let Γ be a cycle graph Ck s.t. 3 ≤ k ≤ 5. When preferences are single-
dipped, there is an FNP and PE SCF.
Proof. For C3, it is easy to see that any SPR is FNP. For C4, the domain of single-
dipped preferences coincides with the domain of single-peaked preferences, since the
point diagonal from a dip point can be considered as a peak point. Therefore, the SPR
with ordering v1 → v3 → v2 → v4 is FNP, as shown in Theorem 3. Finally, for C5,
the SPR with ordering v1 → v2 → v5 → v3 → v4 is FNP.
Theorem 9. Let Γ be a cycle graphCk s.t. k ≥ 6. When preferences are single-dipped,
there is no FNP and PE SCF.
Proof. The identical proof of Theorem 4 applies for any even k ≥ 6, since a single-
dipped preference over a cycle of even length, with a dip point v, coincides with the
single-peaked one with the peak point that is antipodal to v.
We therefore focus on odd k ≥ 7. Assume that an FNP and PE SCF f exists for,
say, C7, and w.l.o.g. that f(θ) = v1 for any θ s.t. I(θ) = V .
Consider a profile θ′ s.t. I(θ′) = {v1, v2, v6, v7}. Since f is FNP and PE, f(θ
′)
must be either v3 or v4; otherwise some agent has incentive to add fake identities.
Furthermore, for the profile θ∗ s.t. I(θ∗) = {v1, v2, v7}, PE(θ∗) = {v4, v5} holds.
Therefore, f(θ∗) = v4 holds; otherwise the agent located at v7 has incentive to add
fake identity on v6, which moves the facility to either v3 or v4.
On the other hand, for another profile θ′′ s.t. I(θ′′) = {v1, v2, v3, v7}, f(θ′′) must
be either v5 or v6 due to symmetry. Therefore, for the above θ
∗, f(θ∗) = v5 must hold,
which contradicts the condition of f(θ∗) = v4. Almost the same argument holds for
any larger odd number k.
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6 Conclusions
We tackled whether there exists an FNP and PE SCF for the facility location prob-
lem under a given graph. We gave complete answers for path, tree, and cycle graphs,
regardless whether the preferences are single-peaked or single-dipped. For hypergrid
graphs, an open problem remains for single-dipped preferences. When such SCFs exist,
completely characterizing their class of such SCFs is crucial future work. Investigating
randomized SCFs is another interesting direction.
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